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Why has postcolonial Africa been so vulnerable to military coups? Examination of the different types of military interventions (plots, attempts, and successful seizures) and comparison of the immediate independence period with the 1970s show the major sources of coups to be ethnic antagonisms stemming from cultural plurality and political competition, and the presence of strong militaries with factionalized officer corps. There is no evidence for a political "overload" due to rising mass participation, but politically factionalized regimes were more vulnerable to coups. During the 1970s, export dependence created political turmoil, which led to plotting, but foreign capital penetration, by strengthening states, deterred coups. Military coups are largely driven by elite rivalries inside the military and the civilian government. Stable civilian rule would require an elite pact to regulate political competition within multiethnic states.
In postcolonial Africa, the military coup has in effect become the institutionalized method for changing governments. Between their independence and 1985, the 45 African states had had 60 successful military seizures, 7 1 attempts, and 126 reported plots. By the mid-1980s, 25 of these states were directly controlled by the military and over 90% had experienced a t least one coup event (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, pp. xxiii-xxviii; McGowan and Johnson 1986, p. 540) . Global-level studies have consistently found Africa the region most prone to coups (Finer 1988; Janowitz 1977; Thompson 1973) . Bertsch, Clark, and Wood (1978, p. 431) , for example, found that "a coup or attempted coup occurred once every 4 months in Latin America (between 1945 and 1972) , once every 7 months in Asia (1947 Asia ( -1972 , once every 3 months in the Middle East , and once every 55 days in Africa (1960-72) ."
This article examines the structural sources of military coups in postcolonial Africa. By a military coup, we mean an irregular seizure of the state's central executive by the regular armed forces or by the internal security forces through the use (or the threat of the use) of force. We thus exclude such civilian irregular transfers as cabinet reshuffling and palace coups. We include plots and attempted coups as well as successful seizures. By focusing on postcolonial Africa, we adopt a comparable cases strategy (Lipjhart 1975 ) of dealing with a set of states with common political and cultural characteristics (i.e., majority control and postcolonial status) yet significant variance in military interventions. The assumption is that focusing on a restricted set of states with extensive coups will reveal central features that can later be specified in terms of their relevance to a broader population of states. This focus also allows us to draw on the data assembled by area experts and to examine factors, such as ethnic configurations, that may be specific to this particular region of the world.
In this article, our first step is to examine simultaneously the major structural causes of military coups. Past work has focused on four such theories. They are: (1) political development ideas about a participation crisis rooted in the tension between an increasingly mobilized citizenry and weak political institutions (Huntington 1968; Barrows 1976; Kasfir 1976; Jackman 1978; Collier 1983) ; (2) the political centrality of the military as rooted in its resources and organizational cohesion (Andreski 1969; Wells 1974; Janowitz 1977; Nordlinger 1977; Finer 1988; Wells and Pollnac 1988) ; (3) plurality, competition, and dominance theories of ethnic antagonisms Stevenson 1972a, 1972 b; McGowan 1975; Jackman 1978; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990) ; and (4) world system/dependency ideas about the political turmoil created by export specialization and foreign capital penetration (O'Donnell 1979; O'Kane 1981 O'Kane , 1983 Thomas 1984; Johnson, Slater, and McGowan 1984; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990; Neuhouser 1992) . Past work has largely looked a t the theories separately and neglected intervening political processes, such as political turmoil and ethnic instability, and structural factors like foreign capital penetration. We will examine them simultaneously, beginning with path models of these theories considered separately and then moving to combined models.
Second, we will compare the wave of coups immediately following independence with the later wave in the late 1970s. Some researchers have traced the earlier coups to party factionalism and ethnic tensions (Zolberg 1968 ) and the later wave to economic problems that might be due to economic dependency (Wells and Pollnac 1988) . We compare the two periods (1960-69 and 1970-82) against the longer panel (1957-84) to see if different factors were at work. This also checks for possible simultaneity bias, a problem that has bedeviled past work (Jackman et al. 1986 ).
Third, we look at different types of coup events, distinguishing plots, attempted coups, and successful seizures. Past work has largely focused on the military intervention index (MII), which combines different types of coup events into a single index. Coups should also be considered as a process that begins with plots, then moves forward to attempts, and possibly culminates with successful seizures. The point along this process at which a coup stops may be rooted in specific conditions. Janowitz (1964, p. 40) , for example, argued that factionalized militaries were prone to plots, but resourceful and cohesive militaries mount successful seizures. Similarly, political development arguments about a participatory "overload" are more relevant for plots and attempts while dependency arguments about the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are especially tied to successful seizures. We therefore compare the MI1 with different types of interventions.
Fourth, past work has left open the possibility that coups are due simply to the hazard or exposure that arises from different dates of national independence. T o make a convincing structural argument, we need to control for the exposure that results from different periods of independent statehood. Otherwise, the interventions could be due simply to the exposure period of independent statehood. We therefore normalize our coup measures for the years of independent statehood. Finally, these discussions have been cast in terms of complex structures, such as weak regimes and ethnic plurality, that have multiple features. Except for our own work (Jenkins and Kposowa 1990) , past research has relied on single measures. A better approach is to use multiple measures of complex structures and the structural equations modeling techniques of LISREL VII (Joreskog and Sorbom 1989) . This is a theorydriven approach in which one first uses confirmatory factor analysis to construct a measurement model of the latent structures based on their covariances and then uses these indices to predict an outcome. We report maximum-likelihood estimates, which also allows us to control for systematic and random measurement error, a common problem in national attribute data.
STRUCTURAL T H E O N E S O F MILITARY COUPS

Political Development Theory
The basic assumption underlying structural arguments is that weak social and political institutions create a greater likelihood of military interventions. We begin by looking at the evidence for each of these theories. The main idea in political development theory is that these "new nations" confronted a participatory crisis stemming from the tension between an increasingly mobilized citizenry and weak political institutions (Deutsch 1961; Huntington 1968; Binder et al. 1971) . First, state building and industrialization have created increased social mobilization and, along with it, more mass participation and increased demands on the political system. Second, these "new nations" lack strong political institutions, especially mass parties and legislatures that have sufficient strength to channel and regulate this rising participation. Multiparty systems are prone to factionalized and deadlocked governments, thereby producing ineffective rule. Third, the resulting participatory overload generates mass political turmoil and thereby provokes military leaders to intervene directly in politics. Frustrated citizens turn to protest and attacks on the state, which provoke military interventions, and military leaders become frustrated with what they perceive as corrupt and ineffective civilian governments.
Several studies have supported the mobilization hypothesis but suggested that rising participation is not an intervening factor. While mobilization gives rise to coups, higher turnout in the preindependence elections deters coups (Jackman 1978) . Collier (1983) traces this higher turnout to ethnic dominance, which created stronger single-party regimes with sufficient legitimacy and cohesion to deter military interventions. McGowan (1975) found that mobilization led to mass turmoil but that, instead of this turmoil provoking coups, it deterred them. The major question is that of the intervening role of mass participation especially in such incidents of political turmoil as protest and armed attacks on the state. Increased mobilization should also create mass ethnic instability, thereby spurring coups. If mass participation is unrelated to coups, then there is no participatory overload. A second question pertains to mobilization. If mobilization is relevant, is this due to higher mass participation or because it directly facilitates coup activity? Finally, there is the weakregime thesis. Several studies have found that multiparty regimes are more prone to coups (Jackman 1978; Collier 1983; Johnson et al. 1984; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990, 1992 ) but we do not know whether this is because of political turmoil or simply the vulnerability of factionalized regimes. Past work has also used simple measures of political factional-ism, such as multipartyism. We use a set of associated measures based on the idea that this is a complex structure. The political overload problem should be most relevant immediately after independence and, assuming that social unrest is central, it should be especially relevant for plots and attempted seizures.
Military Centrality Theory
The central idea in military centrality theory is that resourceful and cohesive militaries are more likely to intervene (Andreski 1968; Janowitz 1977; Finer 1988) . In postcolonial states, the military is frequently the most modern institution, having professionally trained leaders, access to advanced technology, organizational resources, and a strong esprit de corps among its officers. Confronted with the failure of civilian institutions, military leaders are prone to intervene. In this sense, the argument is compatible with the overload thesis. Some, however, have argued that factionalized militaries are more prone to coups. Interservice rivalries, training school loyalties, and ethnic tensions stemming from colonial staffing policies created conflicts within the military that thereby stirred interventions (Smaldone 1974; Mazrui 1975; Janowitz 1977; Nordlinger 1977) . Although seemingly contradictory, these might be compatible. Janowitz (1964, p. 40) argued that factionalized militaries are more likely to engage in plots and attempts while a more cohesive officer corps is more likely to mount successful seizures. We therefore test these as complementary hypotheses in addition to examining the effects of a general military centrality variable.
Several studies have found that the larger the budget and number of troops, the greater the likelihood of interventions (Wells 1974; Johnson et al. 1984; Wells and Pollnac 1988; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990, 1992) . Bienen (1969) and Thompson (1973) , however, contend that the causality runs the other way with successful coups and threatened interventions creating larger budgets. We need a lagged trend design to check this. As for military cohesion, it has proven empirically elusive. Johnson et al. (1984) used a military factionalization index based on the number of ethnic groups in the population and the size of the military, but this does not necessarily tap ethnic tensions inside the military. Smaldone (1974) has argued that, despite being a symbol of national unity, the Africanization of the postcolonial officer corps actually created ethnically factionalized militaries. Africanization meant replacing professionally trained colonial officers with indigenous officers who were more likely to have strong ethnic loyalties. In past work (Jenkins and Kposowa 1990, 1992) , we found that Africanized militaries were more likely to experience coups, but we did not explore the relationship of Africanization to military resources or its impact on types of coup events.
Ethnic Antagonisms Theory
A third focus has been on ethnic antagonisms in the broader political system. Two questions are central. First, what patterns of ethnic relations generate coups? Second, does this work through creating mass instability or by elite factionalism? There are three conceptually distinct ethnic theses: ethnic plurality, dominance, and competition theories. These tensions should be most relevant at immediate independence (Zolberg 1968) and, if they are largely an elite phenomenon, they should be more relevant to explaining successful seizures.
Ethnic plurality theory.--This argument claims that the greater the number of groups and their cultural heterogeneity, the greater the ethnic tensions and therefore the less stable the structure of political coalitions (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Stevenson (1972a, 1972 b) and McGowan (1975) found that ethnic plurality created both mass instability and elite instability. Jackman (1978) , however, found that plurality discouraged coups, arguing that it reduced the likelihood of ethnic tyranny. He did not, however, directly examine the political control of a single group but relied solely on population estimates as proxies. Barrows (1976) , Wells (1974) , and Wells and Pollnac (1988) found that plurality was insignificant, once other factors, especially mobilization and military centrality, were taken into account. Plurality might work through these factors or it might simply be irrelevant.
The ethnic dominance thesis.-This thesis takes the opposite stance, arguing that a large and politically hegemonic group provokes conflicts and, through them, coups. Drawing on theories of majority tyranny, Jackman (1978) argued that large and thus politically powerful groups provoked coups by excluding smaller groups from power. By monopolizing access to such key positions as cabinet posts and top positions in military and para-statal enterprises, dominant groups stir ethnic hostilities, thereby provoking coups (Brass 1985, pp. 29-30) . By this reasoning, ethnic plurality should create a more dispersed power system and thereby greater stability. However, we found that numerical dominance reduced coups, creating greater cultural homogeneity and reducing the challenging capacities of smaller groups (Jenkins and Kposowa 1990, 1992) . I t remains unclear whether the key issue is the size of the dominant group's population or the extent of its control over elite positions. Nor is it clear whether this works through stirring mass conflicts or directly through elite rivalries.
Ethnic competition theory.--Here the central idea is that state building and economic development simultaneously increase the competition between groups and provide greater resources (Melson and Wolpe 1970; Bates 1983; Olzak 1983) . With decolonization, ethnic groups that were traditionally isolated suddenly become competitors for jobs, housing, and urban amenities such as schools and services, as well as more capable of collective action. State building creates a centerpoint for political competition as well as an arena for ethnic mobilization. Urbanization and industrial growth bring these groups into greater competition, simultaneously creating more ecological proximity and thereby facilitating political mobilization. At this point, competition theory converges with political development arguments. Competition also presupposes some degree of plurality. The distinctive feature is the intensity of competition flowing from resource parity. Korpi's (1974) power/balance theory states that the closer the resource parity between the major rivals, the more intense the competition. Thus, Horowitz (1985, p. 437) found that ethnic conflict is greater where two groups are roughly comparable in size and resources. Similarly, we found that the closer the numerical parity between the two largest groups in the general population and in government control, the greater the likelihood of coups (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992) . We need to know how resource parity affects the relationship between mass instability and coups and how it relates to ethnic plurality and dominance aspects.
World systemldependency theory.--This theory focuses on the "neocolonialism" of export dependence and foreign capital penetration. The export dependence thesis centers on the persistence of colonial trading patterns, especially export concentration and the continued reliance on the export of primary products. This "classic" or export dependence creates low and unstable profits, economic stagnation, poverty, and thereby political turmoil. I t is also frequently linked to a coercive labor system that requires a strong military and entails an ethnic division of labor (Paige 1975; Hechter 1978; Wallerstein 1979) . Since there are few economic opportunities for the educated middle class, economic competition is focused on the state itself, thereby encouraging the use of coups and corruption as vehicles for upward mobility (Thomas 1984) . O'Kane (1981 O'Kane ( , 1983 and Johnson et al. (1984) found that the greater the export specialization, the greater the likelihood of military interventions and, in earlier work, we found export dependence indirectly led to coups by creating strong militaries (Jenkins and Kposowa 1990, 1992) . We need to look a t the intervening roles of political turmoil, ethnic instability, and military centrality. In terms of time period, dependency should be equally relevant to the two coup waves and, in terms of types of intervention, most relevant to plots and attempts.
The foreign capital penetration thesis centers on the economic strains created by dependent or "associated" development (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; O'Donnell 1979; Evans 1979; Neuhouser 1992) . Although the theory was originally developed to explain industrialization in Latin America, Bradshaw (1985) argued that Africa is experiencing a similar pattern of multinational investments, government-secured bank loans, the import of advanced technology, and the creation of joint ventures and para-statal enterprises with government protections. This type of foreign-based development is capital intensive and destroys traditional labor-intensive industries, thereby creating unemployment, overurbanization, labor-force tertiarization, and increasing inequality (Delacroix and Ragin 1981; Timberlake 1985; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985) . These factors create domestic political turmoil, thus provoking military interventions and leading to bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (O'Donnell 1979) . Foreign investments should also cause ethnic instability by favoring particular groups, thus creating an ethnic division of labor. In past work, we found that debt, by contributing to strong militaries, led to coups, both directly and indirectly, but that foreign investment was irrelevant (Jenkins and Kposowa 1990) . We need to look a t the intervening roles of political turmoil and ethnic instability as well as that of strong militaries. There is possible simultaneity bias in that capital penetration estimates are available only for the late 1960s. That, plus the fact that the effects of foreign capital penetration should be significantly lagged behind the interventions, makes this argument more relevant to the later wave of coups. Extending the Latin American argument about bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, foreign investments and loans should be tied to successful seizures.
Rival and convergent explanations.-While these are partially rival interpretations, they also have possible convergences. In earlier work (Jenkins and Kposowa 1990) , we used path analysis to find that export and debt dependence contributed to coups indirectly by strengthening the military. I t is also possible that political development processes, ethnic antagonisms, or economic dependency create political turmoil and ethnic instability that provoke coups. There were also two waves of coups, which have been traced to different factors. For example, the earlier wave has been traced to ethnic tensions, while the latter has been linked to economic stagnation. Finally, these factors might result in specific types of interventions. A political overload might lead to plots while foreign capital penetration might generate successful seizures designed to repress mass turmoil.
Our first step, then, is to examine these theories separately using path analysis to capture intervening processes. Second, we will examine a series of combined models that test the structural factors simultaneously. Our assumption here is that the intervening factors are captured by the exogenous structural dimensions. Here we will compare the two coup waves against the entire postindependence period. Finally, we look a t three types of military interventions.
METHODOLOGYANDDATA
Our concern is the likelihood of military interventions, given the underlying sociopolitical structures that prevailed a t independence. We therefore use a cross-sectional-trend design and regression analysis. The assumption is that these conditions gave rise to greater or lesser likelihoods of subsequent coups. In a trend design, independent variables must be measured prior to the dependent measures, which span a lagged period such as a decade or more. Because we assume an initial "honeymoon" after independence, the shortest lagged period is a decade. To compare the two coup waves, we examine two panels (1960-69 and 1970-82) as well as two longer periods (1962-82 and 1957-84) . We also control for exposure on the basis of the division of the number of events by the years of independence within each panel.
These arguments are typically cast in terms of complex social structures, such as factionalized regimes and ethnic relations. To capture these, we use confirmatory factor analysis to construct a series of latent variables from multiple measures and then use these in regression analysis. The assumption is that these structures are best gauged by the covariance of a set of observed measures. Our first step, then, is to test a measurement model for these factors. We hypothesize, for example, that factionalized regimes have several associated features, such as multiple parties, weak leading parties, and factionalized legislatures. We use the confirmatory factor analysis procedures available in LISREL VII (Joreskog and Sorbom 1989) . Our second step is to use these procedures in predicting military interventions. T o conserve scarce degrees of freedom (N = 33), we hold the number of observed measures in the measurement model to a maximum of 29 and the number of latent variables to a maximum of 10. Although we analyze an entire population, which invalidates the use of inferential statistics, we use t-values as a guide to substantive significance. Following convention, we indicate coefficients that are significant a t the .05 and .O1 levels using one-tailed tests. We report maximum likelihood estimates (MLS) for our main LISREL equations and, for submodels that use single measure variables, ordinary least squares (OLS). The MLS estimates have the virtue of being scale-free and of correcting for correlated errors. We also ran the LISREL models using generalized least squares (GLS) and obtained identical results. T o check for influential cases, we inspected the Q plots of normalized residuals for the LISREL models and, for the OLS models, conventional regression diagnostics (Bollen and Jackman 1985) but found no evidence of influential cases.
The sample.-Our focus is on the 33 majority-controlled postcolonial states of s u b -~a h a r a n Africa that have been independent since 1968.' This departs slightly from some earlier studies by including two states that never were formal colonies-Ethiopia and Liberia-because we think their experiences were sufficiently similar to treat them as former colonies. Ethiopia was briefly occupied by the Italians (1936-41) , and the conservatism of the Haile Selassie regime made it a "quasi-colony" (Mazrui and Tidy 1984, p. 243) . As for Liberia, it has been a U.S. protectorate and internally dominated by an Americo-Liberian elite. Our longer time period and control for exposure also allows us to include three states-Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland-that have been excluded from some earlier work.3
Dependent variables.-Our main focus is the military involvement index (MII) collected by Johnson et al. (1984) and McGowan and Johnson (1984, 1986) .~ The MI1 differentially weights plots, attempted coups, and successful coups (scoring them one, three, and five, respectively) and sums these over different time periods. I t assumes that plots reflect less of an intervention than attempts or successful seizures. We also examined a vector constructed from the covariances of these three types of activities, but it produced identical results. We therefore report the results from the MI1 to facilitate comparability. We predict the MI1 over different time periods (1960-69, 1970-82, 1960-82, and 1957-84) as well as the sums of plots, attempted coups, and successful coups to see if types of events have different sources. All measures are normalized for years of exposure.
Between 1957 and 1984, there were 56 coups, 65 attempts, and 109
The states included are: Benin (Dahomey), Botswana, Burkina Faso (Upper Volta), Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazaville), Cote dlIvoire (Ivory Coast), Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia. Past work has used slightly different samples, Jackman (1978) used 29 or 30 cases and Johnson et al. (1984) , 35. We find no evidence of influential outliers, leading us to conclude that minor case differences cannot explain discrepant findings. We exclude Mauritius and Madagascar because of insufficient data. These are also small countries with less than one million population and quite different cultural traditions. Mauritius is largely Hindu and Madagascar is Malayan and Indonesian (Hoffman 1989) .
Past work has included civilian as well as military coups but, a t least in Africa, almost all coups entail military participation, giving the same statistical results (see Johnson et al. 1984, p. 628). plots or an average of 6.96 coup events per country or .26 per countryyear of independence. The MI1 scales successfully with a Cronbach's alpha of .76. I t is positively skewed (skewness = 1.05 1) with a minimum of zero (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland), a maximum of 55 (Ghana), and a mean and standard deviation of 14.09 and 12.56. The sums of plots, attempts, and coups are similarly skewed (1.329, 1.678, and 1.204). We therefore use the natural log, following the rule of logging all variables with a skewness statistic of .9 or more.
Independent variables.-We examine hypotheses based on four interpretations: political development ideas about a political overload created by social mobilization and weak factionalized regimes, military centrality arguments about the resources and cohesion of the military, ethnic antagonism theories about plurality, dominance, and competition, and dependency ideas about export dependence and foreign capital penetration. Since these are complex structures, we use multiple indicators where appropriate data are available. Unless otherwise noted, our data come from the Black Africa Handbook compiled by Morrison et al. (1972 Morrison et al. ( , 1989 . Appendix table A1 provides the results of the measurement model (discussed below).
Social mobilization rests on the political awareness and capacities for political action resulting from increased education, literacy, media exposure, and urban-industrial development. Mobilization is typically treated as a single dimension. However, the confirmatory factor analysis did not support this contention. Examining the covariance matrix, we found strong associations between literacy, education, and media exposure and between urbanization and industrialization. We therefore identified two distinct dimensions: political awareness as based on literacy, education, and mass media exposure and the structural capacity for political action as based on urbanization and industrialization. We therefore use two mobilization indices: (1) a political awareness index based on the literacy rate in 1965, newspaper circulation per 1,000 population for 1960 (Taylor and Jodice 1983) , and secondary school enrollment as a percentage of the population in 1966 and (2) a structural capacity index based on the percentage of urban residents in 1965 and the percentage of the labor force in industrial employment in 1965 (World Bank 1985) .
Mobilization should lead to increased participation, especially masslevel political turmoil and ethnic instability. Because routine participation is secondary to the overload thesis and has been found to be negatively related to mobilization, we focus on mass instability. To capture political turmoil, we use the index developed by Morrison, Mitchell, and Paden (1989) which sums the number of riots, demonstrations, political strikes, terrorist acts, and declarations of emergency from independence through 1975. For ethnic instability we use their (mislabeled) communal instability index that differentially weights the sums of civil wars (each scored as five), rebellions (each scored as four), irredentism (each scored as three), and ethnic violence (each scored as one) from independence through 1979. Both are normed for years of exposure.
Discussions of weak political institutions have centered on the political factionalism of the immediate postindependence legislatures. We used three measures to capture this: the legislative factionalism index for the immediate postindependence legislatures; the regime type based on the existence of multiple legal parties a t independence (or 1967 if no coups had yet occurred) coded as a dummy variable (0 = no parties or one party; 1 = multiple parties) as derived from the country profiles in Morrison, Mitchell, and Paden (1972) ; and, predicted to load negatively, the strength of the leading party based on its electoral margin in the preindependence elections as based on the country profiles.
Military centrality stems from the resources and cohesion of the military. Borrowing from Andreski's (1968) military centrality index, we used two measures of military resources: the number of troops in 1967 and the defense budget as a percentage of GNP in 1967. T o capture officer factionalism, we drew on Smaldone's (1974) argument that early Africanization of the officer corp created factionalism by removing the check of colonial officers and creating competitive rivalries among officers from different training schools, military units, and ethnic backgrounds. We therefore used the six-point Africanization index constructed by Morrison et al. (1972, p. 120) . In constructing a single military centrality vector, we found that resourceful militaries were more factionalized. We used this military centrality vector throughout and, in predicting the types of coup events, we used the resource and officer factionalism vectors.
Discussions of ethnic antagonisms have centered on ethnic plurality, ethnic dominance, and competition between the major groups. The basic idea behind ethnic plurality theory is that the greater the number of groups and the degree of cultural plurality, the greater the possible cleavage lines and the less stable the political coalitions. We therefore used four measures: the number of ethnic groups plus the three cultural diversity indices constructed by Morrison et al. (1972, pp. 172-74) for traditional social stratification, local community stratification, and political authority systems.' The assumption is that this cultural diversity persisted into the postindependence period, creating the cultural bases for ethnic identities.
Ethnic dominance is the inverse of plurality, reflecting the social and political dominance of a single group. Borrowing from Jackman (1978) , ' Ethnic data on Swaziland came from Hoffman (1989). we used the population percentage of the largest ethnic identity group,6 the percentage of speakers of the dominant group's language, language primacy as based on the ratio of first-to second-language speakers, and, to tap political dominance, the first group's percentage in the first cabinet after independence. When we tried to construct separate indices for numerical dominance in the general population and political dominance, we found these could not be identified separately (see below). We therefore treat these together as capturing ethnic dominance.
Ethnic competition theory presupposes plurality. The distinctive argument is that the closer the parity between the major contenders, the more intense the antagonisms and therefore the more likely are interventions. Since the two largest groups are typically the major contenders, we focused on the competitive relation of the second group to the first group. Even in settings where smaller groups are critical political actors (e.g., Uganda), the relationship between the two largest groups is the major consideration. We measured ethnic competition with (I) the second ethnic identity group as a percentage of the population, (2) a competition threshold based on the second group's being 20% or more of the population (treated as a dummy variable), (3) a competition ratio based on the size of the second group relative to the first, and (4) a language competition ratio based on the number of second-language speakers over the number of first-language speakers. To tap the political aspects of ethnic competition, we included the percentage of the second group's cabinet positions in the first cabinet after independence and in the cabinet immediately prior to the first successful coup (or 1967, if a coup had not yet occurred).
We initially assumed that the factor analysis would produce three distinct variables for plurality, dominance, and competition. However, because of similarities in the metrics and underlying dimensions, three separate vectors could not be constructed. The most effective solution was a single ethnic antagonisms variable based on the population measures for all three dimensions plus ethnic political dominance (see App. table Al). In view of the positive loadings of the plurality and competition items and the negative loadings of the dominance items, we interpret positive effects of this vector as reflecting plurality and competition and negative effects dominance. Since plurality is a precondition for competition, these two concepts are obviously related. As noted earlier, ethnic numerical dominance is inseparable from political dominance. However, competition in the general population is distinct from political competition. We Jackman (1978) relied on ethnic cluster measures, which use shared cultural attributes to identify ethnic boundaries. Because they are politically relevant, we use ethnic identity groups, which should capture politically cohesive groupings. therefore constructed a cabinet competition vector based on the two cabinet measures.
T o provide greater clarity about the relations among these dimensions, we also conducted a series of OLS analyses using single measures from each of the three ethnic theories. Guided by earlier correlational analysis (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992) , we selected the two strongest correlates with the MI1 (1957-84) for each ethnic theory and entered these into a series of three-variable equations that combine these three theses.
World systemsldependency arguments center on the external economic dependence produced by export dependence and foreign capital penetration. These factors should create mass instability and strong militaries and also contribute directly to coups. T o capture colonial trading patterns, we used the exports of primary products as a percentage of total exports for 1965-66 (United Nations Commission on Trade and Development 1986)' and an export-concentration index based on the top three export products as a percentage of total exports for 1965. T o capture foreign capital penetration, we used three conventional measures: the stock of private, foreign direct investments relative to gross domestic product (GDP) for 1967, foreign debt relative to gross national product (GNP) for 1970, and the debt service load based on the ratio of debt payments to export earnings for 1968. We initially hypothesized that there was a single economic dependence dimension reflecting on all these measures. However, it could not be positively identified. Inspecting the covariance matrix, we found that export dependence, foreign investments, and debt dependence were three distinct dimensions. We therefore constructed three dependency variables: export dependence, which is based on primary products exports and the commodity concentration index, investment dependence, which we base on the stock of direct foreign investments, and, because the two debt measures were not associated and foreign debt service loads should be more economically disruptive, debt dependence, which is based on the debt service load (App. table Al).
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Analysis of Theories Considered Separately
We begin with an analysis of these theories considered separately and then move to combined models. Several of these theories predict both direct and indirect effects of the structural variables. We therefore include intervening political factors, such as political turmoil and ethnic ' We substituted the mean score for Botswana and Guinea because of missing data. instability, in this first set of analyses and, in the combined models, focus on the structural variables. This method assumes that the structural factors will capture the indirect effects as well. We also compare the two coup waves with the longer period and contrast the different types of coup events.
The results in figure 1 militate against the political development argument about a political overload. While structural capacities lead directly to coups, political awareness and factionalism deter them. Parallelling Jackman's work (1978), we find that a more educated and politically informed citizenry discourages interventions. Moreover, the intervening political processes do not work. Increased mobilization does not lead to mass instability that provokes coups. Increased capacities actually reduces ethnic instability and, while it contributes to political turmoil, this turmoil is unrelated to military interventions. Political awareness and political factionalism are both negatively related to both types of mass instability. In sum, there is no support for the overload argument. Structural capacities do appear to facilitate coups but they do so directly, suggesting that urbanization and industrialization simply create a more conducive context for organizing coups. Figure 2 examines the military-centrality arguments about resources and factionalism in the officer corps. Both are significant sources of interventions, lending support to the idea that both aspects of military organization are relevant. Rather than finding that cohesion creates interventions, we find positive effects for factionalism. This also reinforces the results of the measurement model, which found that resources and factionalism were closely associated. In later analyses, we will also look at the effects on different types of military interventions. We also find support for the ethnic antagonism arguments about plurality and cabinet competition ( fig. 3 ). The positive signs on the ethnic antagonisms vector indicate that ethnic plurality and competition contribute directly to coups while dominance is stabilizing. Ethnic competition inside the cabinet is also a source of lending further support to the competition thesis. These ethnic tensions appear to be primarily a question of elite antagonisms rather than of mass conflicts. While there are some indirect effects of ethnic antagonisms on political turmoil and, consequently, on coups, the more important path through ethnic instability is irrelevant. Although cabinet competition creates ethnic instability, the ethnic structure variable does not and mass-level ethnic conflicts are unrelated to coups. Finally, the direct effects of the ethnic structure vector and cabinet competition are stronger than their indirect effects through political turmoil. The relative significances of ethnic competition and ethnic plurality remain unclear. There is also the puzzle of why these findings diverge from earlier ones for ethnic dominance (Jackman 1978) . To explore these factors more thoroughly, we constructed a series of three-variable equations using one measure each to represent the dominance, plurality, and competition dimensions. Since these are single-indicator variables, we used OLS regression. Using the strongest correlates with the MI1 1957-84, we found consistent support for competition and plurality arguments (tables 1A and 1B). The competitive relation between the second largest and the largest group is the strongest factor, closely followed by plurality in terms of community organization, the number of groups, and social stratification. While cabinet competition is significant, it is not as strong as the competitive relation between the two groups that are largest in population. Dominance is generally negative, reinforcing our earlier conclusion that it discourages interventions. We also tried Jackman's (1978) threshold measure that is based on the largest group's being 40% or more of the population (coded 1 = 40% or more, 0 = less). I t is significantly positive in only two equations (eqq. [7] and [15] ), casting doubt on the thesis. We also used standard regression diagnostics to check these models for influential cases but found no evidence of them. In other words, the divergence from Jackman's (1978) earlier findings for the dominance thesis cannot be explained by the slightly larger sample (N = 33 vs. Jackman's 29 and 30). Since Jackman's threshold measure for dominance is moderately associated with several of the plurality and competition measures (ris between .I2 and .38 for the measures included in the antagonisms vector), it may have worked in his analysis because it was associated with the measures we use for ethnic plurality and competition. In any case, it is clear that ethnic plurality and competition are stronger sources of coups, and dominance is generally stabilizing. Figure 4 examines the economic dependency arguments. None of the direct effects of dependence are significant, yet three indirect paths are relevant. Debt generates military centrality, thereby creating coups. Similarly, export dependence and debt dependence both give rise to political turmoil and, through it, interventions. Export dependence and foreign investments, however, are unrelated to military strength, which undermines the arguments that export agriculture and direct foreign investments require coercion. Foreign investment also has negative effects on both political turmoil and ethnic instability, which militates against the social unrest thesis. While export and debt dependence contribute to ethnic instability, such instability does not provoke coups. that foreign loans are often tied to military purchases, and foreign lenders are probably more willing to lend to militarily strong states. Both are compatible with dependent development arguments but put more weight on the international political relations of these states than their economic dependence. Overall, this is mixed support for the world systemtdependency arguments.
Analysis of Combined Models
We next turn to a series of combined models. Because the structural factors are the most central and we need to keep the number of variables below 10, we exclude the intervening factors. Their effects should be picked up by the structural variables. Here we use the military centrality index that is based on both military resources and factionalization. Table  2 presents the results of the regression analysis of the MII, first for the two shorter panels (1960-69 and 1970-82) and then for the two longer panels (1960-82 and 1957-84) . We control for exposure and report unstandardized maximum likelihood estimates, completely standardized estimates, and t-values. We also ran these equations without controlling for exposure, producing the same results. The only difference was that controlling for exposure reduced the residual errors, thereby boosting the t-values, confirming the idea that controlling for exposure reduces random errors.
Overall, military centrality emerges as the primary source of military interventions. I t has the strongest standardized coefficients and is significant across all equations. A powerful military with claims to national resources and internal factionalism is more likely to intervene. Such interventions are also likely to reinforce these claims, either by placing the The second strongest factor is ethnic antagonisms, which is also significant across all equations. In agreement with our earlier findings, ethnic plurality and competition produce coups, and ethnic dominance deters them. In other words, it is the diversity and competition among ethnic groups, not the dominance of a single group, that leads to military interventions. Cabinet competition is weak and negative in the early panel, indicating that it is not a major source of coups once these other factors are taken into account.
The only political development factor that worked was political factionalism, which was positive in all panels except that of the 1960s. In other words, it has a lagged effect, creating deadlocked regimes that are therefore prone to coups after a period of time instead of a t early independence. Factionalism was negative in the earlier path model, however, indicating that its effects depend on the particular specification of the model. As we found earlier, the more politically aware the citizenry, the less the likelihood of interventions. Structural capacities were insignificant net of these other factors.
Export dependence is the only dependency factor that appears to have a direct positive effect on military interventions, and it is complex, deterring coups during the 1960s while producing them in the 1970s. The foreign capital penetration measures were consistently negative and, in several equations, significantly so, for example, with debt discouraging coups in the 1960s and investments discouraging coups in the 1970s. There are several possible interpretations. First, there is a possible simultaneity bias for the 1960s panel in that debt and investment are measured late in the 1960s (1968 and 1967 respectively) . It could be that states experiencing coups are frightening off investors, thereby reversing the causation. Yet identical signs for the 1970s and the longer panels militate against this interpretation. Second, dependency might be working through intervening factors already included in these equations, such as military centrality, and actually suppress coups once this indirect effect is included. This was indicated earlier by the negative direct effects in the path models. Third, there may be multicollinearity, creating unstable results. We therefore need to explore a series of equations that remove terms that are strongly correlated with the dependence vectors. Fourth, the assumed negative economic effects of economic dependency might not be consistent and might be strengthening the state, thereby discouraging coups.
To explore the second and third possibilities, in table 3 we estimate a series of equations for the 1957-84 panel excluding all terms correlated at .40 or more. This relatively low criterion was used because of the small sample size and the length of the panel in order to standardize comparison with the earlier path models. Equation (1) removes military centrality, which is modestly associated with debt and cabinet competition. Debt remains negative but is no longer significant, while cabinet competition and structural capacity become significantly positive. Equation (2) removes ethnic antagonisms, which is associated with debt, direct investments, and structural capacity. Debt and investment again remain negative, while structural capacity and cabinet competition are again significantly positive. Military centrality and ethnic antagonisms suppress the effects of structural capacities and cabinet competition. Political factionalism becomes insignificant, indicating that it is relevant only when ethnic antagonisms is taken into account. Equation (3) removes structural capacity, which is associated with ethnic antagonisms and investment dependence but these do not change, ethnic antagonisms becoming slightly stronger while investment remains negative and weak. Debt becomes a significant coup deterrent, suggesting that this aspect of mobilization, rather than military centrality, is the intervening factor. Equation (4) removes political awareness, which is also associated with foreign investment, but investment remains negative and insignificant. Debt again becomes a significant coup deterrent. Finally, equation (5) removes foreign investment, which is associated with structural capacity, political awareness, and ethnic antagonisms. These similarly remain stable. In sum, multicollinearity is not the source of the negative investment and debt effects which, net of the two social mobilization factors, appear to be coup deterrents. These models do, however, indicate that cabinet competition and structural capacities are coup sources and that multicollinearity is responsible for their weak effects in the larger equations. Since these were both relevant in the earlier path models, it would seem better to continue considering them as coup sources.
To explore the fourth possibility-that economic dependence is not a source of economic problems-we estimated a series of simple equations using dependency measures to predict economic growth and the fiscal strength of the state. Since economic growth and state fiscal strength were negatively related to coups over the entire period (R2 = -.42 and -.13),' the key question is whether they are affected by economic dependency. Because export dependence switched signs across the two panels, we examined its effects on economic growth across two time periods, independence through 1972 and 1973-82. Both export dependence measures were weakly, positively related to growth in the 1960s (R2 = .O1 and .08 for commodity concentration and primary exports) and negatively to growth in the 1970s (R2 = -. 11 and -.09). While these are weak effects, they suggest that export concentration was not a source of stagnation until the 1970s and might have even contributed to growth during the immediate postindependence period. Since the foreign capital penetration measures were made in the late 1960s, we predicted economic growth from 1970 to 1982. Foreign capital penetration was negatively but insignificantly related to economic growth (R2 = -.05 and -.001 for direct investments and debt load), which suggests that We used World Bank (1986) estimates for average annual economic growth for 1960-1982 and, to estimate fiscal strength, direct taxation as a percentage of total government revenue (Morrison et al. 1972, p. 111). dependent development was not creating stagnation that could lead to coups. Direct investment and debt load were, however, positively tied to state fiscal capacities (R2 = .12 and .08), supporting one aspect of dependent development theory, namely, that foreign capital creates stronger states. These stronger states, however, are more resistant to coups, possibly explaining the negative effects of foreign investment and debt. The causation may also work the other way, foreign investors being more willing to invest in and lend to fiscally strong states, thereby reinforcing this effect. In any case, export concentration is the only aspect of economic dependency that performs as predicted, and it was a weak source of stagnation and coups only in the 1970s. Foreign capital penetration strengthens these states and thereby deters interventions.
In a final step we look at the types of military interventions. The basic idea is that coups are a process that begins with plots, then turns into open attempts, and, finally, culminates in successful seizures. This coup process might be halted a t a particular point by underlying structural factors. Plots require little preparation and should therefore be spurred by underlying discontents, while actual attempts require resources and organization. A successful coup also requires a vulnerable target. Following this logic, underlying ethnic tensions, military factionalism, and middle-class frustrations stemming from export dependence should lead to plots while military resources should create attempts. A weak factionalized state should encourage attempts and successful seizures while foreign capital penetration should bring about successful seizures. Table 4 shows the results for predicting the sums of these events for the longest (1957-84) panel, controlling for exposure. In general, the same factors drive all three types of interventions. Military centrality and ethnic antagonisms have consistently strong effects. Political factionalism, which, earlier, was relevant only in the 1970s, is now consistently positive, indicating that factionalized polities succumbed to all types of military interventions.
There is also support for our arguments about different types of interventions. The presences of ethnic antagonisms and export dependence are stronger in predicting plots, supporting the idea that underlying grievances nurture plotting. The existence of political factionalism is more important in predicting attempts and successful seizures, supporting the argument about the vulnerability of factionalized states. As for foreign capital penetration, it follows the earlier results, rendering these states resistant to all three types of interventions. In discouraging attempts, debt is important and direct investments discourage successful coups, suggesting that debt and investment strengthen the state and its ability to ward off interventions. Military centrality is important to plots and successful seizures. Since this might be explained by Janowitz's (1964) argument that military factionalism leads to plots while resources lead to successful seizures, we also ran these models with the substitution of officer factionalism and military resources as separate vectors. Both predicted all three forms of interventions with the only exception being that officer factionalism did not contribute to attempts. At least in the African context, factionalism and the resources of the military are sufficiently linked together that they both lead to all types of military interventions. Finally, structural capacity facilitates attempts, suggesting that urbanization and industrial growth create a more conducive setting for staging attempted seizures.
We also checked for multicollinearity by reestimating these equations with the omission of the two factors that produced problems in the earlier equations: ethnic antagonisms and military centrality (table 5). The findings reinforced our conclusion that structural capacity and cabinet competition are sources of coups in that they both were consistently significant in the equations. The reestimations also specified the effects of foreign capital penetration. Debt showed as a source of plotting but was negative or unrelated to the other forms of intervention. Because of the association with ethnic antagonisms and military centrality, this debt effect does not show in the earlier equations. A possible interpretation is that debt creates financial stringency and, through it, military grievances which encourage plotting. In reinforcement of our earlier findings, direct investments deterred interventions, especially plots and successful coups. Overall, the reestimations support the general idea that structural conditions linked to grievances within the military or the middle class generate plots, factionalized states are more vulnerable to attempted coups, and strong militaries are more likely to launch successful coups.
CONCLUSIONS
The major force behind military interventions is military centrality. A military strong in resources and a factionalized officer corps both contributed to interventions. This holds for all types of coup events and across the different time periods. Strong militaries are especially likely to organize successful coups, reflecting their political centrality in these states. Although the Africanization of the officer corps was a potent symbol of national sovereignty a t independence, it also proved to be a source of elite instability. By removing the check of colonial officers and creating internal rivalries and factionalism inside the military, Africanization created a setting for military interventions. These militaries were also more resourceful, reflecting their symbolic status and political centrality in the newly independent states. Following Andreski's (1968) thesis about military centrality, these resources created militaries that were more likely to intervene. While the causation may also work the other way, militaries that are prone to coups may extract greater resources from the government, the pattern of strong militaries mounting interventions is clearly evident from our analysis. Yet, contrary to Janowitz's (1964) thesis, both military resources and internal factionalism contributed to plots, attempts, and successful seizures. At least in Africa, military strength and factionalism were closely associated with one another and combined to generate all three types of interventions.
The second major source for coups was ethnic plurality and competition, especially a close parity of resources between the two largest groups. Both plurality and competition were relevant and showed up significantly across different time periods and in different types of interventions. Plurality made it more difficult to form stable political coalitions, and ethnic competition, especially inside the government, created elite rivalries. In general, the closer the parity of resources between the two largest groups, the greater the likelihood of interventions (Olzak 1983; Horowitz 1985) . These ethnic rivalries were largely an elite-level phenomenon. Although cabinet competition created mass ethnic instability, this did not lead to coups. Instead the pluralistic, competitive structure of the population directly created coups. In contrast to the earlier work of Jackman (1978) and Johnson et al. (1984) , we found that the dominance of a single large group was a source of stability, creating greater social homogeneity and reducing the challenging capacity of the smaller groups. Ethnic antagonisms were also more relevant immediately after independence and were more important to plots than to other forms of interventions.
Is ethnicity a source of coups outside of Africa? I t is impossible to tell without broader comparison but the elite nature of the ethnic rivalries in Africa suggests a possible convergence with neo-elitist theories of political instability suggested by Burton and Higley (1987) . In line with the states in their discussions, these states began as liberal democracies but ethnic rivalries within the military and political elite prevented there being an elite pact regulating peaceful political competition. Elites soon turned to irregular means, responding to perceived governmental incompetence and ethnic injustice by resorting to the threat of force. While ethnic rivalries often pervaded the general populace, the major actors were elites who already had the means to influence political decisions but had not agreed on peaceful rules of combat. Ethnicity, then, was key because it was the basis for elite power and organization.
We did not find support for the idea of a political overload rooted in weak political institutions and an increasingly mobilized citizenry. While political factionalism did contribute to coups, the idea of an overload rooted in mass participation and political turmoil is erroneous. Earlier work has argued that higher electoral participation deterred coups by creating stronger single-party regimes with greater legitimacy (Collier 1983) . Building on this, we found that a more educated and politically aware citizenry discouraged coups. Structural capacities were the only mobilization factors that contributed to interventions, especially to attempts, and these were not mediated by mass turmoil or ethnic instabil-ity. In other words, structural capacities simply created a favorable context for organizing coup attempts. The most useful idea from political development theory concerns the strength of political institutions. Multiparty regimes with factionalized legislatures and no clear leading party were more prone to coups. They were less likely to experience mass instability but they were also prone to governmental stalemates, thereby provoking military interventions. Military officers, seeing themselves as controlling a modern, efficient institution and frustrated by the seeming incompetence of civilian governments, have taken power directly into their own hands. Significantly, this vulnerability to intervention has increased over time, it was irrelevant at early independence but became more important in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Dependency arguments about the economic frustrations and coercive regimes created by the persistence of colonial trading patterns received some support. By creating strong militaries and political turmoil, export dependence contributed to plotting and to interventions during the 1970s. This had not been true in the 1960s when an international export boom in raw materials and agricultural products had neutralized these problems. By the 1970s, however, the economic stagnation created by export concentration had caused economic frustration among the educated middle class and among the military, thus stirring up plots.
Foreign capital penetration, however, was generally a source of stability. Direct foreign investments and debt, instead of creating mass political unruliness and provoking military coups, created strong states that were more resistant to both. Although, during the 1970s, foreign capital was moderately linked to economic stagnation, it did not work through this to create military interventions. The only path that worked was foreign debt that was linked to stronger militaries and, in some equations, contributed to plots. It is possible that the reverse causation also holds, namely, that a military intervention in a state threatened foreign investors, scaring off foreign investments that might have strengthened that state. In any case, this pattern does not fit the dependent development arguments about political rebellions and military interventions. This does not exclude the possibility that, eventually, foreign capital penetration will so weaken these economies as to bring about political turmoil and military interventions, but our results do not show this.
We did not examine the international political dependence of these states. Boswell and Dixon (1990) found that an international political dependence based on the concentration of foreign arms supply was a source of rebellion. By extension, such a situation might create strong yet factionalized militaries and weaken these states, thereby contributing to coups. Similarly, the contribution of debt to strong militaries may reflect the dependence of the affected states on foreign arms suppliers.
International political dependence is sufficiently distinct from economic dependence to deserve separate treatment.
A second area that needs further work is the elite nature of ethnic antagonisms. Past discussions have typically been framed in terms of a mass-level ethnic revival that ethnicized African polities, thereby creating elite instability (Zolberg 1968; Kasfir 1976) . Our results indicate instead that ethnic tensions are primarily an elite phenomenon. Ethnic tensions inside the military, nurtured by early Africanization of the officer corps, and ethnic competition inside the cabinet contributed to coups. Communal conflicts were irrelevant. Ethnicity, then, is primarily relevant because those who are powerful enough to influence political decisions are organized in terms of distinct ethnic identities. Military coups are another form of ethnic competition in which ethnic elites use irregular means to gain or preserve their political advantage. It may be that constructing an elite pact about the rules of political competition is essential for democraticizing African polities and thus creating the basis for stable civilian rule.
A structural approach emphasizing ethnicity and military centrality appears quite successful in explaining African military coups. Although individual plotters may be motivated by personal rivalries and psychological needs, they act within a structural context that makes coups more or less likely. We also found that several arguments were relevant for particular time periods or types of military interventions and that others worked through intervening factors, such as political turmoil or strong militaries. Future work should apply these ideas outside of Africa and explain the origins of military centrality and the political processes that have made ethnicity such an explosive force within postcolonial Africa.
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